State of Utah v. Albert R. Jaramillo : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
State of Utah v. Albert R. Jaramillo : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John T. Caine; Attorney for Appellant.
James H. Beadles; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Sandra L. Sjogren; Depty Weber County
Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Jaramillo, No. 940494 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6146
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l e e 
v . 
ALBERT R. JARAMILLO, 
D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
Case No. 940494-CA 
P r i o r i t y No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-8 AND FOR FAILURE TO PAY A DRUG TAX IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-19-106 IN 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE HON. 




K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO 1H0 
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
JOHN T. CAINE 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
2549 Washington Blvd. #700 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLHg j  j  ^ ; D 
MAR 2 11S95 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
ALBERT R. JARAMILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940494-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-8 AND FOR FAILURE TO PAY A DRUG TAX IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-19-106 IN 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, THE HON. 
MICHAEL J. GLASMANN PRESIDING 
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
JOHN T. CAINE 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
2549 Washington Blvd. #700 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640 (Utah App. 1993) 6 
State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991) 7 
State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992) 8 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 1, 2 
State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992) 7 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 9 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (a) (1995) 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1994) 1 
OTHER AUTHORITY 
7 Utah Bar J. Utah Standards of Appellate Review 9, 13 
(1994) 8 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUE ONN APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE LEGAL 
CITATION OR ANALYSIS RENDERS THIS COURT 
UNABLE TO REVIEW ON APPEAL THE ISSUE OF 
THE LIABILITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT . . 
POINT II EVEN ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
COMPLIES WITH RULE 24, HE FAILED TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND, THEREFORE, 
THIS COURT MUST ACCEPT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FACTUAL FINDING AND AFFIRM ITS DENIAL 






IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
ALBERT R. JARAMILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940494-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AHP NATURE py PfrQCSPPINgS 
This Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
This appeal challenges the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly find that the search warrant 
was issued prior to the commencement of the search? 
Whether the search warrant was issued before the search was 
executed is a question of fact, which this Court modifies only if 
the finding is clearly erroneous. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
935-36. A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if it is not 
adequately supported by the record, "resolving all disputes in 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant provisions are attached to this brief in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
Defendant contests the validity of the search warrant by 
which the police searched his car and ultimately seized cocaine. 
(R. 155). Defendant moved to suppress the evidence taken via the 
search because the search warrant did not contain any notation as 
to its time of issuance; therefore, he argues, the warrant may 
have been issued after the search took place. (R. 276-277). The 
trial court denied the motion to suppress and the evidence was 
later admitted at the trial. (Id.) A jury convicted Defendant 
for possessing drugs with intent to distribute and for failing to 
pay drug tax. (R. 71). 
Statement of Facts 
On February 14, 1995, Sargeant Chris Zimmerman of the Weber-
Morgan Narcotics Strike Force received a telephone call from a 
fellow agent who was conducting surveillance of a yellow 
Chevrolet Nova. (R. 228). At approximately 8:30 that morning, 
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Sargeant Zimmerman met with the agent and discussed information 
that the police had obtained on the vehicle. (Id.) The agents 
decided together that there was sufficient information to request 
a search warrant from a judge. (Id.) Two agents, Ashment and 
Lasater, maintained surveillance on the vehicle while Sargeant 
Zimmerman went to the police station to prepare a search warrant. 
(R. 229). 
Sargeant Zimmerman finished drafting the search warrant at 
either 10:30 or 10:45 a.m. and then waited approximately 15 
minutes for Judge Parley Baldwin to take a recess from his court 
calendar to review and sign the warrant. (Id.) Judge Baldwin 
testified that he could not remember the time he signed the 
warrant, but he also stated that he had no reason to dispute 
Sargeant Zimmerman's recollection that it occurred at 
approximately 11:00 a.m. (R. 227). 
Once he obtained the search warrant, Sargeant Zimmerman 
orally informed the surveillance agents. (R. 229) . Instead of 
immediately searching the vehicle, the officers decided to wait 
until someone took the car. (R. 229) At approximately noon, 
Defendant entered the car and began driving away. (R. 230) 
Within a few minutes, the officers stopped the car and began 
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searching both the car and Defendant. (Id.) The officers found 
cocaine, (R. 106). 
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial 
court ruled that Sargeant Zimmerman's account of the chronology-
was credible and that, based on the evidence, the warrant was 
obtained prior to the stop and the search. (R. 279) On that 
ground, the trial court held that the search warrant was in 
effect when the search occurred and, therefore, denied the motion 
to suppress. (R. 278). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court must accept the trial court's factual findings 
unless Defendant marshals all the evidence in support of the 
trial court decision and then demonstrates the "fatal flaw" in 
that factual decision. Though the transcript of the relevant 
hearing is replete with evidence that supports the trial court, 
Defendant neither marshals it nor shows how that evidence fails 
to support the court's factual decision that the warrant was in 
effect at the time of the search. 
Defendant's argument essentially relies on two fundamentally 
incorrect propositions: 1) a search warrant, based on an 
affidavit, must state the time it was issued; and 2) absent an 
indication of the time of issuance, the trial court must assume 
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that the police carried out the search before the warrant was 
issued. However, Defendant cites no authority for either 
premise. Further, he does not refer to any cases requiring that 
courts assume police officers conduct searches without required 
warrants. 
Here the court heard evidence from the judge that signed the 
search warrant, and three of the officers involved in the 
investigation and search. Based on this evidence, the trial 
court found that the search warrant was in effect and denied the 
motion to suppress. That decision was ultimately based on the 
trial court's judgment that Judge Baldwin and the officers were 
credible and that their recollection of the chronology of events 
was accurate. Indeed, Defendant put on no evidence disputing the 
State's contention that the warrant was issued at approximately 
11:00 a.m. on February 14, 1994, one hour before the search 
occurred. 
AfrgVMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE 
LEGAL CITATION OR ANALYSIS RENDERS 
THIS COURT UNABLE TO REVIEW ON 
APPEAL THE ISSUE OF THE LEGALITY OF 
THE SEARCH WARRANT, 
Defendant challenges the trial court's "choice" to believe 
the police officers in denying the motion to suppress. (Brief of 
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Appellant at 7). However, he provides no legal authority to 
support his view that this choice was incorrect. Defendant 
recites testimony from the suppression hearing, impugns the trial 
court's determination and concludes with the unsupported 
assertion that the trial court erred because it could not find 
"with certainty" that the search warrant was issued before the 
search. 
Defendant cites to only one case, State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 
640 (Utah App. 1993), which is used in the standard of review 
portion of the brief. For the rest of his assertions of law, 
Defendant fails to include any citations to authority or legal 
analysis. An unstated, though implicit fundament of the brief is 
the proposition that a search warrant, even when based on an 
affidavit, must state the time it was issued. For this novel 
rule Defendant provides no citation nor does he even purport to 
analyze why such a rule should be made. In his conclusion, 
Defendant states that the trial court erred because it did not 
find that the search warrant was issued before the search "with 
certainty." Though this extraordinarily high burden of proof is 
stricter than even the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden in 
criminal trials, Defendant refers to no cases that state 
"certainty" is required in suppression hearings. 
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The rules of appellate procedure expressly require that a 
brief include an argument which "shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) (1994). 
Defendant's brief fails to set forth the legal analysis or 
authority that this Court has consistently required; therefore, 
his "argument" is legally meaningless and does not merit review 
by this Court. State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 248-49 n.5 (Utah 
App. 1992); State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991). 
II. EVEN ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT'S 
BRIEF COMPLIES WITH RULE 24, HE 
FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ANDf 
THEREFORE, THIS COURT MUST ACCEPT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDING 
AND AFFIRM ITS DENIAL OF THE MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS. 
Defendant not only contests the trial court's decision to 
believe the police officers' statement of the facts, but also 
presents an underlying legal assertion: that a search warrant 
must have the time it was issued on its face to be valid. 
Forgetting for the moment that Defendant has cited no authority 
for this proposition, the statement is incorrect as a matter of 
law. Although Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (a) (1995) does 
require the magistrate to enter the time of issuance when a 
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telephonic warrant is issued based on sworn oral testimony, the 
law does not impose a similar requirement for personally 
presented warrants that are based on an affidavit. Defendant's 
underlying legal claim, that the search warrant was invalid 
because it did not state the time of issuance, therefore is 
inapplicable to this case. 
This Court has consistently affirmed that an appellant's 
duty to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's ruling 
is fundamental to an attack on a factual finding. Norman H. 
Jackson, 7 Utah Bar J. Utah Standards of Appellate Review 9, 13 
(1994) . The duty to marshal does not end at the accumulation of 
all the evidence in support of the decision. The appellant must 
then show that the evidence is "legally insufficient to support 
the findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light 
most favorable to the decision." Id.: State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 
487, 491 (Utah App. 1992). 
When it announced that it was denying Defendant's motion to 
suppress, the trial judge explained his reasoning and summarized 
the evidence accumulated at the hearing: 
After hearing the testimony given by the 
agent-detectives that were involved in this 
case, it appears believable to the Court that 
the reason Zimmerman left after meeting with 
Ashment was to go and get a search warrant. 
8 
And that the time frame that he described is 
about how long it would have taken him to 
prepare it and go get it signed. . . .[0]n 
the balance of the evidence presented, I 
believe that the search warrant was obtained 
prior to this stop, and prior to the search 
being effectuated. 
(R. 278-79) The court's decision was based on the credibility of 
the only witnesses before it, the agents who watched the vehicle, 
the officer who obtained the search warrant, and the circuit 
court judge who signed the warrant. In substance, Defendant 
urged the court, and now urges this Court, to disbelieve the only 
evidence offered. Determination of factual questions though 
necessarily involves judgments about witness credibility and such 
judgments are best left to the trial courts. See State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)(clearly erroneous 
standard recognizes trial court's advantaged position in judging 
credibility). Because Defendant presents no legal authority for 
his assertions nor establishes that the court's factual findings 
are unsupported by the evidence, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. 
CQNCLWIQN 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately 
presented in the briefs, oral argument would not significantly 
aid the Court in deciding this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ^ '^day of March 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
.JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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77-23-204. Examination of complainant and witnesses -
Witness not in physical presence of 
magistrate - Duplicate original warrants -
Return. 
(1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the 
issuance of a search warrant shall be given on oath and either 
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim. Transcription of the 
recorded testimony need not precede the issuance of the warrant. 
Any person having standing to contest the search may request and 
shall be provided with a transcription of the recorded testimony 
in support of the application for the warrant. 
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in 
the absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may be issued upon 
sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the physical 
presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate is satisfied 
that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. The 
sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by 
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and 
transcribed. After transcription, the statement shall be 
certified by the magistrate and filed with the court. This 
statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for purposes of this 
section. 
(a) The grounds for issuance and contents of the warrant 
issued pursuant to Subsection (2) shall be those required by this 
chapter. Prior to issuance of the warrant, the magistrate shall 
require the law enforcement officer or the prosecuting attorney 
who is requesting the warrant to read to him verbatim the 
contents of the warrant. The magistrate may direct that specific 
modifications be made in the warrant. Upon approval, the 
magistrate shall direct the law enforcement officer or the 
prosecuting attorney for the government who is requesting the 
warrant to sign the magistrate's name on the warrant. This 
warrant shall be called a duplicate original warrant and shall be 
deemed a warrant for purposes of this chapter. In these cases the 
magistrate shall cause to be made an original warrant. The 
magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of the 
duplicate original warrant on the face of the original warrant. 
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the original 
warrant shall be in conformity with this chapter. Upon return, 
the magistrate shall require the person who gave the sworn oral 
testimony establishing the grounds for issuance of the warrant to 
sign a copy of the transcript. 
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall issue 
a search warrant. 
